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Theories of market microstructure suggest that large transactions can reveal information and 
hence impact prices. Extensive research finds support for such a price impact. However, we 
are not aware of any similar studies at Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Other studies have 
typically been conducted at hybrid markets, e.g. New York Stock Exchange, where there are 
specialists that facilitate trading. OSE, on the other hand, is a fully electronic limit order 
market, thus the price dynamics may be different. The implication of a price impact for a 
trader who plans to submit multiple orders in a stock is that the first trades affect the price of 
the later trades.  
We analyze the temporary and permanent impact on security prices from large buy-initiated 
and sell-initiated transactions. We find that large trades are associated with significant price 
impacts 5 seconds and 10 minutes after the transactions for most of the stocks in the sample. 
There are significant intraday differences in the estimated price impacts. Furthermore, we 
study the aggregated difference between buy-initiated and sell-initiated turnover, i.e. order 
flow. We analyze a model where returns over 15 minute intervals are explained by the past 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Market microstructure 
A basic assumption in financial economics is that individual buying or selling of a security 
does not change its price. One solid argument for this assumption is that trading a security 
cannot change the firm’s underlying cash flows. Since investors presumably agree that the 
share price should reflect the discounted value of all future cash flow, we do not expect that 
the trading of a share can change the price permanently. E.g. a positive deviation from the true 
value, which is caused by a large buy transaction, is expected to be offset by others selling. 
The theory of microstructure1 on the other hand, argues that the more informed traders trade 
larger quantities than uninformed traders. Hence, there may be price impacts from larger 
trades, because the transactions contain information. For a trader who is paying more today, 
there is little comfort in an assumption stating that the stock price eventually will return to the 
true price. E.g. if a trader submit a series of buy orders, the first transactions may increase the 
prices for the future transactions.  
To measure the price impact of transactions and order flows we use a high frequency dataset 
from Oslo Stock Exchange. These types of datasets grant the researcher with more 
possibilities than with daily data, but they also contain challenges from a data processing and 
econometric perspective. Processing the raw data is an extensive task that made it necessary 
to acquire certain skills in programming. To ease the effort for future scholars of market 
microstructure, we have enclosed a stylized example in Appendix E that shows how one can 
extract similar data.  
In the first research question we study the price impact of large buy-initiated and sell-initiated 
transactions. Like other empirical studies we measure the price impact in two time 
dimensions, temporary and permanent. We define the temporary and permanent price impacts 
as five seconds and ten minutes returns respectively. For most of the stocks in the sample we 
find significant price impacts. There are also significant intraday differences in the estimated 
price impact. In the second research question we study a model of returns in 15 minute 
intervals explained by the past aggregate buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions, i.e. the 
                                                 
1 The term for studies on the trading mechanisms in the financial securities markets is market microstructure 




order flows. We find that a positive (negative) normalized order flow is associated with a 
positive (negative) return the next 15 minute interval. We also control for differences in 
intraday return and reject the null hypothesis that they are equal. However, the R-squared is 
low compared to similar studies performed with indices. 
 
1.2. Oslo Stock Exchange 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) is a fully electronic limit order market located in Oslo, Norway. 
Relative to other exchanges has OSE an overweight of commodity industries, such as energy 
producing, oil-service, and aquaculture. The market capitalization March 2007 and March 
2010 was NOK 1835 (USD 301) and NOK 1324 (USD 223) billions respectively2. The 
continuous trading session last from 09:00 Central European Time (CET) to 17:203 CET 
(henceforth, all hours are in CET). Before the continuous trading session begins there is an 
opening auction where traders can submit orders. Crossing of these orders are done at a point 
in time between 09:00 to 09:05 at a price that maximizes the nominal value traded. The 
opening auction starts at different times for each stock (the most liquid first). Since the start 
for the continuous trade session can vary both for securities and different days, we 
conveniently define the continuous trade session to start 09:05 in our analysis.  During the 
continuous trade session orders are crossed automatically according to a strict price-time 
priority rule. The continuous trade session ends 17:20 and after there is a closing auction 
equal to the opening auction.  
Limit orders have both a price and a quantity limit, usually limit means the price limit 
(henceforth, limit is price limit, unless otherwise stated). Most fully electronic limit order 
markets follow a similar strict price-time priority rule as OSE. This means that an 
unconditional4 buy (sell) limit order is crossed if the limit is equal or higher (lower) than a 
previous submitted sell (buy) order (in this chapter we assume orders are unconditional).  
OSE allows traders to submit orders that “walk the book”, i.e. buy (sell) orders are crossed to 
the best available prices given the price and quantity limit of the order. Traders can also 
submit market orders that we can interpret as limit orders with an infinite limit. The order 
                                                 
2 http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics/monthly-reports (accessed 29.11.2011) 
3 OSE extended trading hours by one hour the 1st of September 2008 (Oslo Børs ASA, 2008). 
4 Traders can also submit orders that are canceled if there are not enough offers to fill the order immediately (fill 
or kill). Alternatively the trader can submit orders that are canceled after it is filled with the maximum number of 
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orders with partially hidden volume5. Quoted prices, on the other hand, are accurate since the 
order book always shows a part of the hidden volume submitted by traders.  
Chapter 2: Literature 
2.1. Theory  
2.1.1. Prices 
In economics, prices are determined by the equilibrium between supply and demand. How the 
prices actually reach the equilibrium is metaphorically referred to as the “invisible hand” or 
the “black box” of trading. It is not obvious when and how this equilibrium actually occurs, 
neither does it seem that the general economic literature is concerned with this issue. Theories 
of market microstructure, on the other hand, provide possible answers by describing and 
analyzing the trading of assets under explicit rules, i.e. how the specific trading mechanism 
affects the price (O'Hara, 1995).  
According to Hasbrouck (2007) there are no comprehensive and realistic models for limit 
order markets. The theory of market microstructure has traditionally been developed with 
regards to the traditional dealer market. Since we study a market without dealers, specialists 
or market makers one might argue that theories for dealer markets do not apply for limit order 
markets. However, the basic insights are relevant for the empirical analysis, and hence we 
review some of these theories. 
 
2.1.2. Informed and uninformed traders 
A common assumption in financial economics is that the security prices reflect all publicly 
available information. The oft-quoted paradox is that for the share prices to reflect all publicly 
available information someone has to analyze the securities, and why should anyone bother to 
do so when the prices already reflect all information? The theory of market microstructure 
analyzes some of the traders’ game theoretical issues. One class of models is information-
based that allow for the presence of individual traders with superior information, i.e. 
asymmetric information. Superior information may be private information that is not publicly 
                                                 
5 Orders with partially hidden volume (iceberg order) have a maximum public volume that is shown in the order 
book and the rest of the volume is hidden. When the public volume is crossed a new equivalent part of the 
hidden volume is revealed, with a new time priority.    
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available, and the ability to interpret information better or faster than the other market 
participants.  
An important question when analyzing the market participants is why uninformed traders 
willingly would transact with informed traders. One might compare it to a novice poker player 
entering a game against a world champion. It may be realistic that they would do so just for 
the mere entertainment, but not with the expectation to win and certainly not to participate in 
a series of games. A possible explanation was proposed by Bagehot6(1971), he argues that 
uninformed traders confuse trading gains with market gains. By attributing profits to trading 
skills rather than realizing that the market tends to move upwards, traders may perceive that 
they have an edge and trade more frequently than they should. According to Bagehot, traders 
are seduced by the random walk argument and believe that even an idea or hunch will give 
them a return over time. Furthermore, he assumes that there are another group of traders that 
in fact have superior information.  
The market makers’ role is to provide liquidity by transacting with anyone wishing to trade, 
this includes trading with both uninformed and informed traders. Given that the market 
makers have no private information about the true value of the firm, they will on average lose 
against the informed traders. For market makers to survive in the long run, the profits they 
make from uninformed traders must exceed the losses inflicted by informed traders. Since 
market markers typically are obliged to provide quotes at all times the only way to balance 
profits and losses is by setting the difference between bid and ask quotes large enough. The 
important notion for all models of auctions with market makers is that the presence of 
asymmetric information will result in a positive bid ask spread, even with a risk neutral 
market maker that makes zero profits (Glosten and Harris, 1988). Trading is a zero sum game 
where the informed traders have an expected positive gain and the market makers none, this 
implies that uninformed traders on average lose on their trading activities. Uninformed traders 
are also called noise traders in the market microstructure literature (see Black (1986) for a 
general discussion on noise).  
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show that private information is valueless given that all the 
participants have rational expectations and the initial allocation is Pareto optimal. The latter 
condition is true in reality at OSE, because each trading day starts with an opening auction. 
Since the largest possible nominal value is crossed in the opening auction it is reasonable to 
                                                 
6 Bagehot is a pseudonym, the real Walter Bagehot died in 1877. 
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assume that the initial distribution of stocks 09:05 is Pareto optimal. Milgrom and Stockey 
(1982) argue that after an initial auction the only reason to trade would be an advantageous 
bet, i.e. private information that is not reflected in the share price. However, if everybody 
knows that other traders only trade given that they have private information, there would be 
no reason to buy or sell the stock. Because of this it is a general assumption that some 
investors trade for pure liquidity reasons, e.g. pension funds that needs to convert securities to 
cash to pay retirees.  
Kyle (1985) propose a dynamic model for sequential auction equilibrium. He considers a 
market with multiple market makers, informed and noise traders (i.e. liquidity traders). Noise 
traders are assumed to have a distribution independent from the informed traders quantities at 
all times. In the model Kyle assume that there is one informed trader, who is profit 
maximizing and risk neutral, i.e. an intertemporal monopolist. This is a strict assumption and 
it seems reasonable that there can be more than one informed trader. Furthermore, he assumes 
that market makers earn zero profits on average and have no private information. Hence, price 
changes are always a consequence of the observed aggregated order flow. One of the key 
insights from the model is that the informed trader must consider the price impact of 
transactions on future prices to maximize his monopoly profits, i.e. divide their total demand 
into smaller trades. The oft-quoted Stealth trader hypothesis suggests that this would make the 
informed traders concentrate their trading in medium sizes, because of the cost associated 
with small trades (Barclay and Warner, 1993).   
Due to the normality assumption for noise traders, Kyle’s sequential auction model converges 
to a Brownian motion process for prices when the time between the sequential auctions goes 
towards zero. This model relies on the crucial assumption that the informed traders submit 
orders in such a way that the information is gradually reflected in the security prices, i.e. if 
there is more noise trading one period there is also more informed trading.  However, if there 
are more informed traders there would clearly be incentives to trade before other informed 
traders increase (decrease) the price. It may also be restrictive to assume that noise traders are 
submitting pure random orders, regardless of order flow and time.    
Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) consider a more realistic model, building on the framework 
proposed by Kyle (1985). The model differs from Kyle’s by allowing for multiple informed 
traders and strategic behavior for noise traders. The rational for the latter is that in reality we 
observe volumes that are typically larger early and late in the continuous trading sessions. The 
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informed traders (minimum one) are assumed to observe part of future public information one 
period ahead. Furthermore, there are two kinds of liquidity traders, nondiscretionary and 
discretionary. The latter have flexibility to split their orders over periods restricted to a 
quantity traded within a given time. Admati and Pfeiderer (1988) show that noise traders will 
buy relatively more in the period prior to their given time limit. However, the model lacks as 
the private information only is useful for one period. 
The models suggest that market makers will change prices as a function of net order flow and 
that prices gradually will reflect the information.  They both assume that there is no way to 
distinguish informed trading from uninformed. Another perspective is that the trade size of 
each transaction can reveal information (Easley and O'Hara, 1987). Easley and O'Hara argue 
that an informed investor would trade larger quantities at any price, given that he knows that 
the price do not reflect the true value. Since the uninformed do not have this quantity bias, one 
should expect relatively larger trades to contain more information than small.    
Neither of the models (Kyle, 1985; Admati and Pfeiderer, 1988) considers the choice between 
limit and market order, i.e. traders could submit a limit order within the spread. This trade-off 
between waiting for a better price and the cost of trading now with certainty is defined as the 
implementation shortfall (Perold, 1988). Almgren and Chriss (2000) quantify this relationship 
in an efficient frontier for optimal execution strategy.  
An important question is whether we should expect the same dynamics in a limit order market 
as predicted by these theories or not. The absence of market makers can conceptually be 
solved by interpreting limit orders as market maker quotes. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
sustain the assumption that some traders are more informed than others and that some traders 
trade for liquidity reasons. The market maker’s inclination to buy (short) stocks on his own 
account and short the stocks to satisfy take sell (buy) orders, may impact the results of studies 
of market impact. Hence, studies at e.g. the New York Stock Exchange may differ from our 
findings because of the organization of the market. Nevertheless, the most critical assumption 
for our thesis is that larger trades contain an information component. We claim that the 
informed traders’ preference for large quantities still apply without a dealer, hence it is 
reasonable to test for a price impact from large trades.  
There may also be traders that passively submit both bid and ask orders to profit of the spread, 
thus acting as temporary market makers. Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) divided traders into 
two groups; active and passive traders. Passive traders can avoid execution cost imposed by 
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the bid-ask spread by waiting for the contra side of the market to take their offers. Thus, they 
provide liquidity for other traders and may reduce the bid-ask spread. Active traders want 
immediate transactions, e.g. a trader that wants to buy will rather pay a price that is rounded 
up than waiting. By this definition active traders are the ones that affect the traded prices and 
initiate the transactions.  
 
2.2. Empirical studies 
There is extensive research on price impacts of large trades. However, we are not aware of 
any studies performed with data from Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE).  Holthausen, Leftwich and 
Mayers (1987) study the effects of large block transactions on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). Their results suggest that buy-initiated block transactions are associated with a 
permanent increase in the stock price. However, sell-initiated block transactions seem to have 
temporary effect on prices, but only weak evidence of permanent effects. In later work 
Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) analyze how quickly prices reach a new equilibrium 
after large block transactions. They find that prices adjust within at most three trades after the 
block transaction. Another study at NYSE, conducted by Chakavarty (2001), analyzes which 
trade sizes that move prices. He finds that medium-size trades are associated with the largest 
cumulative price impact. 
 Chan and Lakonishok (1995) analyze sequences of trades (packages) that they interpret as 
one order. The study uses data of orders and trades submitted by investment management 
firms at the New York and American Stock Exchanges. These orders are in most cases 
submitted over several days. They find that the weighted average price impact is higher when 
orders are considered as a package and claim that it is naïve to consider one order or trade 
isolated. We argue that if one considers multiple orders as a sequence, the results might 
depend on the investment manager’s reactions on the stocks return after the initial order.  
Hence, we believe it is reasonable to consider individual transactions. 
Koski and Michaely (2000) study the information content of different sized transactions 
during periods with varying degree of asymmetric information. They find that large trades 
have the largest price impacts during periods when asymmetric information is at its highest. 
Furthermore, they find that the spread increase and depth decrease significantly after large 
trades, but not after small trades. Another interesting finding is that the effect of the trade size 
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is non-linear. Hasbrouck (1991) also find that the relationship for the permanent price impact 
is concave.  
Order flow is a term used in many empirical studies related to return and variance, i.e. the 
aggregate of buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions. Relative order flow (Blume, et al., 
1989) is a measurement for the imbalance between the value of buy-initiated and sell-initiated 
transactions. A positive (negative) result from this calculation indicates a net buying (selling) 
pressure. An alternative measures for this imbalance is the normalized order flow 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Blume, MacKinlay and Terker (1989) finds that the 
relative order flow has a positive and significant effect on returns in 15 and 30 minute 
intervals. Other studies have found similar conclusions and that various order flow 
measurements describe much of the variation in stock returns (e.g. Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam, 2004; Moberg, 2008; Dunne, Hau and Moore, 2010).  
Chapter 3: Framework and hypotheses 
The common assumption from the theories we have described is that there are informed and 
uninformed traders. Traders can observe the transactions (but not other traders’ identities) at 
the exchange and may be influenced by other market participants’ trades. Hence, traders’ 
reactions to large transactions may cause price impacts. Basically there are two views traders 
can have on anonymous transactions. The first view is that only the large trades contain 
information and can cause a price impact. The rationale for this view is that informed traders 
have a demand for larger quantities of shares, regardless of the price (Easley and O'Hara, 
1987). In Research Question 1 (RQ1) we analyze this price impact from large trades. The 
second view is that informed or smarter traders split their orders (Barclay and Warner, 1993) 
and that we cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed trades. Then traders may 
analyze the aggregated order flows, and interpret an overweight of buy-orders (sell-orders) in 
a period as an indicator of a future price increase (decrease). This is analogous to the market 
makers’ behavior in models of informed and uninformed trading (Kyle, 1985; Admati and 
Pfleidere, 1988). In Research Question 2 (RQ2) we analyze the price impact from the 
aggregated order flow. The two views are complementary in the sense that traders can both 
take large trades and the order flow into account.     
10 
 
3.1. Modeling the price impact 
3.1.1. Temporary and permanent impact 
The temporary price impact is a liquidity shock due to the trade which results in a short term 
disequilibrium. E.g. when a trader buys all stocks offered at the best ask price it may take 
some time before new orders arrive at this level. If the deviation persists, we define it as a 
permanent impact, i.e. information related. 
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) propose a model where the temporary impact is the difference 
between the transaction price and the quote midpoint7 q  and the permanent impact is the 
difference between the present and a future quote midpoint. Our measurement differs from 
Bertsimas and Lo (1998) since we measure both temporary and permanent impact as the 
difference in quote midpoints, for increased comparability. Hasbrouck (1991) estimate the 
return as the change in the quote midpoint8. Because we estimate models for multiple stocks a 
percentage measure is more suitable.  
We define the temporary and permanent impact as five seconds and ten minutes percentage 









By estimating the mid quote returns we avoid autocorrelation caused by the bid-ask bounce. 
This phenomenon occurs when a trade at the ask (bid) price is followed by a trade at the bid 
(ask) price and hence the quoted price change regardless of changes in the bid and ask prices. 
The bid-ask bounce causes an expectation of the return series to be negatively autocorrelated.  
 
3.1.2. Trade size 
There is no single definition of what constitutes a small or large transaction. In order to 
determine whether a trade is a small or large it is necessary with a benchmark that is 
comparable across securities. One alternative is to use the number of shares traded, e.g. 
                                                 
7 q 	  




Chakravarty (2001). This definition lacks comparability because the value per share and total 
outstanding differs between stocks. One alternative would be to use the value of the 
transaction as measurement. However, this ignores that some stocks may have different levels 
of trading activity, which may affect the price impact. We find a more suitable measure to be 
percentage of the total daily traded volume S  as done in Kissell and Malamut (2005).  
 
3.1.3. Buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions 
The size of a transaction is a strict positive variable. For there to be any meaningful 
interpretation of the price impact we make a distinction between buy-initiated and sell-
initiated transactions. Otherwise, one could argue that for every buyer there is a seller. Active 
traders demand immediate transactions and hence submit market orders. Presumably active 
traders have an urgent need for buying (selling) the stock that may indicate an expectation of 
positive (negative) short term return. If the trader have no expectations about the short term 
return he will know that submitting limit buy (sell) orders with a limit lower (higher) than the 
current ask (bid) are associated with lower average execution cost. We also realize that there 
are other reasons to submit market orders, such as an urgent hedging need. Passive traders, on 
the other hand, submit limit orders lower (higher) than the current ask (bid) quotes and the 
order may not be crossed. Passive traders may also submit orders on both bid and ask like a 
market maker, and profit from the spread. From this we have that an transaction at the current 
ask (bid) quote is buy-initiated (sell-initiated). 
 
3.1.4. Expected return 
Incorporating expected return is a crucial part when modeling asset prices and returns. In our 
case the intervals are diminutive, thus adding a drift term to our model will most likely disturb 
more than it explains9. This measurement error comes before choosing the actual expected 
return, e.g. CAPM or another factor model. Hasbrouck (2007) analyse the removal of 
expectation and identify a negative bias, but a significant reduction in estimation error. We 
consequently believe that omitting the expected return and the dividend rate will give a more 
parsimonious model for describing the data generating process.   
                                                 
9 Assuming 250 trading days, 8.5 hours trading sessions, evenly distributed returns, and 10 % annual returns give 
an expected 10 second (10 minute) return of 0.00001 % (0.00075%). 
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In order to model price impact of large trades we assume a drift term 	 β  that is conditional on 
trade size (Almgren, Thum and Hauptmann, 2005). Since we are only measuring the returns 
and over such a small time span, the difference between the arithmetic and the more complex 
geometrical Brownian motion will be trivial (Almgren and Chriss, 2000).  
 
3.2. Research questions and hypotheses  
3.2.1. Research question 1 
Are large stock transactions followed by temporary and permanent price impacts, and are 
there intraday differences? 
We assume that the temporary price impact of a trade is liquidity related. Traders of large 
transactions may consume large parts of the available quantity offered, and hence it may take 
some time for other traders to submit new orders. However, the price is expected to return to 
its equilibrium after new orders arrive. For measuring the temporary impact r  from large 
trades we use a linear model.  
Other empirical studies find that the impact is greatest for medium sized trades (e.g. Barclay 
and Warner, 1993; Chakravarty 2001). This could suggest that an information component is 
declining for some trade sizes. We use the square root of trade size √S  to model the 
permanent impact. The reason for this is that other empirical studies (e.g. Hasbrouck, 1991; 
Koski and Michaely, 2000) find a concave relationship for the permanent impact, i.e. 
increasing, but diminishing with trade size.  
We measure the permanent impacts r  in ten minute intervals, and it is reasonable to 
assume that there are more factors influencing returns compared to the temporary impacts. 
Therefore, we take a more comprehensive approach by including two additional variables in 
our model. We include normalized order flow (ν ) to account for the omitted small 
trades. Lakonishok, et al. (1992) propose normalized order flows as a measurement of the 
imbalance between buy-initiated and sell-initiated trades. Positive normalized order flow 
means that there are an overweight of buy-initiated transactions, i.e. net buying pressure. 
Hence, we would expect that a positive (negative) normalized order flow is related to a 
positive (negative) return the next 10 minutes. The normalized order flow is calculated for the 
interval ten minutes before the transaction to one second before the transaction.  The reason 
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for the one second lag is that including the same second mean that normalized order flow also 
contains the value of the transaction T .  
We also include the lagged return (r 	 ) in case there are momentum or mean reversal 





∑ T ∑ T	
∑ T ∑ T	
 
 
Theory, e.g. Admati and Pfleidere (1988), suggests that trading will be concentrated in certain 
periods of the day. Because informed traders are likely to trade when volume is high (Kyle, 
1985; Admati and Pfleidere, 1988), we will test for differences in the impact during intraday 
trading. Moberg (2008) find that the volume pattern is U-shaped on OSE, i.e. more volume 
traded at the start and at the end of a trading day. Other studies (e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev, 
1997; Almgren, et al., 2005) find the same U-shaped pattern for the volatility. We identify the 
same volume characteristic in our sample and the result is shown in the data chapter. There 
may be several reasons for increased volume parts of the day, e.g. passive funds that trade at 
the end of the day because they track an index that is measured by closing prices. We test for 
intraday differences by including slope dummies for each hour of continuous trading for both 
the buyer and seller initiated trades, resulting in 16 dummies. The base case is trading from 
0905 to 0930, then one slope dummy D  for each trading hour10. Sell-initiated transactions 
are modeled with a slope dummy (D , i.e. the price impact for a buy-initiated (sell-initiated) 
transaction is β β β  multiplied with the square root of trade size in percentage of daily 
traded volume. 
  
                                                 
10 D 09: 30 1030 1, D 10: 30 1130 1,… , D 16: 30 1720 1|	other	hours	D 0 
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Table 1 - Models and hypotheses for research question 1 
 
Model 1, temporary impact 
 r β S β S D ∑ δ D S ∑ ϕ D S D ε  
: β 0, β 0, β β 0, δ , δ , . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . , ϕ 0 
:	β 0, β 0, β β 0, δ , δ , . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . , ϕ 0 
 
Model 2, permanent impact 
r β √S β √S D β ν β r ∑ δ D √S  
∑ ϕ D √S D ε  
: β 0, β 0, β β , β 0, β 0, δ , δ , . . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . . , ϕ 0 
: β 0, β 0, β β 0, β 0, β 0, δ , δ , . . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . , ϕ 0 
 
1. Alternative hypothesis: Large buy-initiated (sell-initiated) trades are followed by a 
positive (negative) temporary price impact. The temporary price impact from large 
trades varies intraday. 
2. Alternative hypothesis: Large buy-initiated (sell-initiated) trades are followed by a 
positive (negative) permanent price impact. The lagged return coefficient is different 
from zero. Normalized order flow coefficient is positive. The permanent price 
impact from large trades varies intraday. 
 
3.2.2. Research question 2 
 Will an overweight of buy-initiated (sell-initiated) transactions be followed by positive 
(negative) returns, and are there intraday differences? 
It may be more reasonable that traders make interference from the aggregated order flow 
rather than single traders, because of the difficulty associated with interpreting a single trade. 
Empirical studies finds that order flow explain a large part of return variation in indicies (e.g. 
Blume, MacKinlay and Terker,1989; Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004; Moberg, 2008; 
Dunne, Hau and Moore, 2010). Hence, we test if order flow is able to explain return in 
individual stocks.  
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The model we study has the aggregated sell-initiated T  and buy-initiated T  turnover 
in a 15 minute interval as the independent variable, i.e. normalized order flow ν . 
Normalized order flow is always between -1 and 1, where 1 (-1) mean that all trades in a 
period are buy-initiated (sell-initiated). We measure normalized order flows’ effect the effect 





∑ T ∑ T
∑ T ∑ T
 
 
Given that individual trades contain information, we expect that the difference between buy-
initiated transactions and sell-initiated transactions in a period to contain more information 
than individual trades. Furthermore, we expect traders with private information to split their 
orders to disguise their private information (Barclay and Warner, 1993). The order flow may 
capture this effect better than large individual transactions. When normalized order flow is 
greater than zero the value of buy-initiated transactions are greater than the value of sell-
initiated transactions, i.e. a net buying pressure. Hence, we expect the impact on the future 
price β  to be positive.  
Moberg (2008) measure how imbalance in the order flows explains OBX return.  He find that 
foreign market return and local order flow jointly explains a large part of OBX return 
variation. His result suggests that return in the continuous trading session are affected by the 
return during opening auction. To capture this effect we include the overnight return 
r  as a separate variable. We calculate overnight return as the difference between the 
last mid quote of the previous continuous trading session and first mid quote of the current 
continuous trading session. Overnight return is included as a slope dummy variable in the first 
interval, i.e. 09:05 to 09:20. We also include seven intercept dummies11 to model intraday 







                                                 
11D 10: 05 11: 05 1, D 11: 05 12: 05 1,… , D 16: 05 17: 05 1|	other	hours	D 0 
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Table 2 - Model and hypotheses for research question 2 
r 	 α β ν β r β r α D ε  
:		β 0, β 0, β 0, α 0, α 0, . . , α 0 
: β 0, β 0, β 0, α 0, α 0, . . , α 0 
 
Alternative hypothesis – Positive (negative) normalized order flows are followed by positive 
(negative) returns the next 15 minutes. The overnight return and lagged return coefficients are 
different from zero.  
Chapter 4: Data 
4.1. Data sample 
The data material is extracted from the OBI12 Continuous Data Feed (OCDF) and includes all 
trades and orders at Oslo Stock Exchange in the period the 1st of March 2007 to the 30th of 
March 201013. We use the Perl programming language for parsing of the raw data.  For each 
continuous trade session, we first track all changes of the best bid and ask quotes, and make a 
temporary series with the last mid quote for each second.  
To facilitate the first step, the time for each observation is calculated in seconds from 
midnight, i.e. 09:05 and 17:20 (16:20) are 32700 and 62400 (58800) seconds after midnight 
respectively. For each 29700 (26100) seconds in the continuous trade session we save the best 
bid and ask quotes. In the same operation we also save each transaction with the best bid and 
ask quotes available at the same time, this means the last update of the best bid and ask quote 
before the transaction. Thereafter we extract the dependent and independent variables for each 
transaction in the temporary series. We use the open source program R to perform the 
econometric analysis (R Development Core Team, 2011). The R-packages used can be found 
in the references. 
In the OCDF stocks are identified by ISIN numbers. Some stocks change ISIN number during 
our sample period. For this reason we select stocks that have the same name from March 2007 
to March 2010. This excludes some stocks that may have gone bankrupt, merged with other 
companies or for some other reason are not listed under the same name. By selecting only 
                                                 
12 Oslo Børs Information AS. 
13  The days; 04.07.2007, 15.03.2009, 08.05.2009, 04.06.2009, 16.06.2009, 21.06.2009 and 24.01.2010 was 
removed due to incomplete files. We have a total of 766 continuous trade sessions in our sample.  
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survivor stocks the average return may be higher than a sample including all stocks, this is 
called a survivorship bias. The price impacts we analyze are assumed to be both positive and 
negative. Thus, higher return in our sample cannot mean that we find price impacts because of 
survivorship bias, but the dynamics we find may not be representable for stocks in distress. 
Hindsight bias is possible in an analysis of price impacts, ergo when one includes information 
that is not available at the time of the trade. However, in our data processing we have only 
included explanatory variables that according to the OCDF occurred before the price impact 
we measure. Because this is a fully electronic market, it is reasonable to assume that the 
sequential data is correct.    
We find 147 stocks that fulfill the name criteria. We extract all trades and changes of the 
order book for these stocks from the OCDF data. After excluding stocks which are traded on 
less than 70 % of the 766 days, we have 112 stocks available for analysis.  
 
4.2. Data processing 
We analyze high frequency data and therefore is market microstructure noise an important 
aspect. Microstructure noise is a term that describes all price movements in the trading 
process, inter alia the bid-ask bounce, information of trades and discreteness (price ticks) (Aït-
Sahalia and Yu, 2009). The ratio between the noise and the information added when reducing 
the intervals is called the noise to signal ratio, this ratio is lower for more liquid stocks (Aït-
Sahalia and Yu, 2009). Much microstructure noise present in the series make it difficult to 
find any relationships about the price impact. Thus, it is important to control for and to reduce 
the noise in the dataset. We reduce this noise through both data handling and through our 
variables. Returns are calculated as the difference in the quote midpoint in order to remove 
the bid ask bounce. This reduces a large part of negative autocorrelation and hence noise in 




Table 3 - Descriptive statistics for the 112 stocks in the dataset 
Ten most traded Ten least traded          Sample 
Description – daily figures  Average Median Average Median Average Median 
Trade value (in 1000 NOK) 471 830 392 091 290 298 54 666 1 466 
Number of trades 2 461 2 175 8 7 367 65 
Trade volume (in 1000 shares) 192 180 35 43 149 58 
Trade size of total daily volume 0.04 % 0.05 % 12.24 % 14.37 % 0.27 % 1.54 % 
 
The 112 stocks in our sample have considerable different characteristics. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 3. We see that the data has a positive skewness in terms of trade size 
and number of trades. For comparability of the results we prefer stocks with relatively 
homogenous characteristics. Furthermore, modeling stocks with large differences in 
frequency of trading require different time-series models. Ideally we would utilize as much of 
the dataset as possible, but since similar models and individuals make the estimation and 
interpretation more convenient we exclude less traded stocks. The OBX14 index include the 
25 most liquid stocks in the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) and is a natural 
starting point for the selection. We include 19 stocks that both fulfill the name criteria and are 
included in the OBX index in the beginning of the sample period. Additionally, we include 11 
additional stocks which are in the same turnover range. Hence, our analyses are limited to the 
30 most traded stocks of the 112 stocks, measured by the total NOK turnover. Due to 
infrequent trading in certain periods for some stocks, we include the 20 most traded stocks in 
the panel data analysis.  
We remove the opening and closing auction from the sample as Næs (2004) and Moberg 
(2008). In the opening and closing auctions all trades are executed at the same price, 
consequently there is no measurable price impact. Table 4 shows how many of the trades that 
are removed due to the opening and closing auctions. 
Table 4 - Decomposition of when trades occur 
Trades Opening auction Closing auction Continuous auction
29959576 819305 721419 28418852 
100 % 3 % 2 % 95 % 
 
                                                 
14 Tickers for the 25 stocks in the OBX index the 1st  of March 2007; ACY, AKER, AKVER, AWO, DNBNOR, 
DNO, FOE, FRO, MHG, NHY, NSG, OCR, ORK, PGS, PRS, SDRL, STL, STB, SUB, TAA, TAT, TEL, TGS, 
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In all the models we make distinction between buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions and 
hence we must classify each transaction. Transactions at the current ask (bid) quote is buy-
initiated (sell-initiated). The problem is related to classifying executed at a price between the 
bid and ask quotes.  
 
Table 5 - Transactions in our sample 
Bid Ask  Bid, Ask15 
46 % 47 % 7 % 
 
As Table 5 shows, most of the transactions in our sample are traded at the current ask or bid 
price. Some studies identify the sell-initiated or buy-initiated trades by simply comparing the 
price of the trade with the last trade, this is known as the “tick test” (Lee and Ready, 1991). 
This test is typically used by researchers who do not have quote data, only transaction data. 
The most robust method to determine if a transaction is buy-initiated or sell-initiated, is to 
track all orders and find which of the orders participating in a transaction that was submitted 
last. As an example, if the last submitted order is a sell order, the transaction is classified as 
sell-initiated. Trades between the bid and ask quotes are mainly caused by internal trades 
within member firms of OSE (Moberg, 2008). Hence, there are no corresponding orders in the 
order book. Odders-White (2000) studies various classification methods and find that the tick 
and midpoint method misclassifies 21.4 % and 9.1 % respectively. Because we cannot 
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with a low nominal share price, because the tick size will cause the percentage price changes 
to be larger than for other shares. We do not exclude these stocks, but since we select the most 
traded stocks most of them are removed indirectly. 
Chapter 5: Empirical analysis 
5.1. Research question 1 
5.1.1. Time dimension 
The transactions are by nature irregularly spaced in time because the time between trades can 
occur at any fraction of a second. Thus, we should consider the time dimension in the models. 
Wall clock time and event time are two alternative methods for arranging of the data 
(Hasbrouck, 2007).  
Wall clock time means that the researcher arranges the return series in intervals based on the 
time of registration. An example of the use of wall clock time is 15 and 30 minute intervals. 
In order to make these intervals, the researcher typically calculate the difference in mid quote 
from a point in time and the mid quote 15 or 30 minutes later. The observations in this 
interval are omitted, just as the intraday observations are in daily return series. One advantage 
of applying wall clock time in a study is that microstructure noise can be reduced through the 
use of longer intervals. Furthermore, all observations have the same interval length which 
means it is more convenient to estimate models and to compare results.  
Event time, on the other hand, enables the use of all the observations regardless of when they 
occur. Including all the observations increases the presence of market microstructure noise in 
the sample compared to wall clock time. However, there is a trade-off between reduction of 
noise and actually measuring the price impact. E.g. in RQ1 we measure the price impact from 
large trades, predefined intervals may omit many large trades and hence event time is better to 
capture all of the large trades. We use event time for registering large trades, but to measure 
the price impacts r , r  from the transaction we use wall clock time. Measuring the 
price impact a certain number of transactions forward in time decrease comparability, because 
of the differences in frequency of trading. The use of event time for the transactions is another 
argument for exclusion of the small trades, because this reduces the microstructure noise. 
Since price impact coefficients are the difference in mid quote over an interval and the 
transactions occur in event time, some of the price impact observations are overlapping. E.g. 
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we measure the temporary impact as the mid quote return the next five seconds, this give a 
perfect overlap for trades the same second and an imperfect overlap for the trades the next 
four seconds. Overlapping observations result in persistent and non-converging 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable and is more present in the model of the permanent 
impact. If not controlled for the overlapping problem can give a persistent moving average 
specification in the models’ residuals (Harri and Brorsen, 2009). Alternatively we could 
measure the temporary and permanent price impact over a longer horizon and reduce the 
microstructure noise. However, increased length of the price impact also increases the 
overlapping problem.  
 
5.1.2. Estimated models 
With shorter intervals in financial time-series there are often autocorrelation present, but due 
to the overlapping problem the autocorrelation is larger than for a normal return series. In 
order to model the autocorrelation in our data we apply the Box-Jenkins methodology. We 
explain the methodology and show some graphical output from our model fitting process in 
Appendix C. 
 
We estimate the following models for each stock (i): 
1) ∆r , β , ∆S , β , ∆S , D , ∑ δ , ∆D S , ∑ ϕ , ∆D S , D , Δ	u ,  
2) ∆r , β , ∆S , β , ∆S , D , 	 	β , ∆ν , 	β , ∆r ,
	 ∑ δ , ∆D S ,
∑ ϕ , ∆D S , D , ∆u ,  
 
u , ε , 	∑ b , ε , 	
 
 
u , ε , ∑ b , ε ,   
We have assumed that the stocks in the sample have similar characteristics after testing on a 
selected sample. Our conclusion is that MA (3) and MA (6) specifications, integrated at level 
one, for temporary and permanent impact models respectively. These specifications remove 
most of the autocorrelation present in the residuals. Although by studying the squared 
residuals from MA specifications we identify autocorrelation which indicate volatility 
clustering in the series. Alternatively we could model the conditional heteroscedasticity with a 
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generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model (GARCH) (Bollerslev, 1986). 
However, we do not believe heteroscedasticity to be a severe problem in our data at large and 
uneven spaced observations make estimation of conditional volatility problematic.  
 
5.1.3. Summary results 
Coefficients with their significance level from model 1 and 2 can be found in Appendix A. 
We estimate one model for each of the stocks and this give a total of 480 estimated dummies. 
To test for intraday differences in price impact we use a likelihood ratio (LR) test16. The 
results from the LR test are shown in Appendix B (Wooldridge, 2008). We use maximum 
likelihood to estimate the models and hence we use a LR test instead of an F-test. In Table 7 
we present a summary of the hypotheses. We use a standard significance level of 5 %.  
 
Table 7 - Result summary 
Model Explanatory variables Alternative hypotheses Sum of  rejections  
1	 S , 	 β 0 27 
1	 S , 	,	D , 	 β 0 28 
1	 S , 	,	S , D , 	 β β 0 29 
1	 D S , 	,	D S , D , 	 δ , δ , . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . , ϕ 0 30 
2	 √S , 	 β 0 25 
2	 √S , D ,   β 0 30 
2	 S , 	,	S , D , 	 β β 0 21 
2	 ν ,   β 0 29 
2	 r ,
	
  β 0 30 
2	 D S ,  , D S , D ,   δ , δ , . . , δ , ϕ , ϕ , . . , ϕ 0 27 
 
The results support the alternative hypotheses, for most of the stocks, that large trades are 
associated with a temporary impact and a permanent impact, i.e. large buy-initiated (sell-
initiated) transactions are associated with a positive (negative) return the next 5 seconds and 
                                                 
16 Test statistics: LR = 2 L L   L is the log-likelihood for the unrestricted L  and restricted L  model.  
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In Figure 5 we assume that the lagged return r ,
	  and the normalized order 
flow	 ν ,  are zero. The estimated ten minute lagged return coefficient ranged from  
-0.5247 to -0.0296, i.e. positive return in a ten minute period is associated with negative 
return the next ten minutes. Figure 5 has an upward bias if large buy-initiated (sell-initiated) 
transactions are associated with positive (negative) return the previous ten minutes. This bias 
makes us reluctant to interpret the relatively larger permanent impacts in comparison with the 
smaller temporary impacts.   Nevertheless, the interval from 09:05 to 09:30 differs from the 
rest of the day as buy-initiated and sell-initiated transactions have a larger estimated price 
impact than all other hours of the continuous trade session. However, the differences seem 
smaller than for the temporary impact.  
The normalized order flow and the estimated coefficient range from 0.0001 to 0.0004. This 
mean that an overweight (underweight) in buy transactions is associated with a positive 
(negative) return the next 10 minutes. These results are significant for 29 of the 30 stocks, and 
indicate that not only the large trades impact prices.    
The permanent impact is consistent with microstructure theories that suggest that there is an 
information component in large transactions (Easley and O'Hara, 1987). However, there is no 
way to separate the information components when measuring the impact, thus we do not 
claim that the estimated impact is solely information related.  
 
5.1.6. Economic significance 
An important question is how to interpret the economic significance of the coefficients. In our 
case this is dependent on the size of trades and the current shape of order book. To illustrate 
how the coefficient can be interpreted we provide an example. Recall from Chapter 1.2 how a 
trader at OSE can submit limit orders that “walk the book”. Assume that we wish to buy a 
large quantity (TQ) of stocks. We can either buy all the stocks we want with a market order 
immediately. Assume that we alternatively can buy equal quantities at the first level	 P 	  in 
fixed number (N) of 10 minutes intervals. This might not be optimal, e.g. Bertsimas and Lo 
(1998) propose a solution to an analogous optimization problem that give different quantities 
for each period, given a fixed price impact. Multiple orders may also be associated with an 
additional fixed cost to the broker α  per transaction. Given that we are risk neutral the 
preferable alternative is that with the lowest expected average share price, i.e. buy now if the 





	 	∑ 	 	
  
The left side of the above expression is the average share price if we buy all stocks at the first 
level or we “walk the book” immediately, i.e. we pay P 	  at each level i  where we buy Q  
stocks. If we can buy all the stocks at the first level now the average share price is equal to the 
current best ask price. Hence, we should buy all the stocks now because our estimated price 
impacts are positive and submitting multiple orders are associated with a fixed cost. On the 
other side, if we have to submit an order that “walk the book” i levels and hence the average 
price is higher than the current best ask and the solution to the optimization problem is not 
straight forward. The current order book is known, but the expected ask quote is uncertain. 
Given that the spread is fairly constant, the estimate percentage change of the ask price can be 
approximated by the percentage change in the mid quote. Thus, we estimate the change in the 
ask quote with model 2 r β √S β √S D β ν β r 	 	 ∑ δ D √S ε . 
We ignore the time dummies and assume that the normalized order flow and lagged return are 
zero, hence we can estimate the future ask price conditional on our past trades: 
E P 	 	 P 	 e √  	
E P 	 	E P 	 e √  
Where S  is a transaction n 10 minutes periods after the first trade  as a fraction of the 
estimated total volume during this trade session. As we see from the decision problem above, 
economic significance depends on the quantity required and the shape of the current order 
book. Furthermore, future prices are conditional on our current and future trades and hence 
the price impact should be considered during execution of large orders. It is clear that if the 
estimated price impacts are correct, the optimization problem has a solution for all quantities 
and stocks. However, to determine whether this approach to execution gives better outcomes 
would require out-of-sample empirical analysis. This would be to extensive for this thesis and 
are left to future research. Nevertheless, lower values for the estimated price impacts 
β √S 	 associated with our trades, favors splitting the order if there is insufficient volume 




5.2. Research question 2 
Panel data has both a cross sectional and a time dimension. There are alternative methods 
available that can be used if there are unknown individual factors that affect the residuals. We 
use a pooled regression because there are no significant fixed effects. After we include the 
lagged return there is no autocorrelation present in the residuals. We use heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors to account for differences in variance. Relevant tests that support these 
approaches are given in Appendix D. 
Some of the stocks are not traded in each 15 minute interval of the continuous trading 
sessions. The reason for this is that some of the most traded stocks do not have a constant 
volume in the sample period. We observe that some stocks are traded infrequently in the 
beginning of the period and hence we get an unbalanced panel. Other reasons for missing 
observations might be trading halts imposed by the exchange because of suspicious trading 
activity or news announced by a company. These periods are treated as missing observations. 
However, we have arranged the data in such a way that the lagged return and order flow 
always corresponds to the return the next 15 minutes, i.e. the first return variable each day is 
the return from 0920 to 0935, with explanatory variables from 0905 to 0920, i.e. the last 
explanatory variable for each continuous trading session is order flow from 16:50 to 17:05.  
 
Table 8 - Results from the panel data regression model 
 Unbalanced Panel: n=20, T=20298-22900 
N=451704      
  Estimate Std. Error* Coeff. P-value 
α   -0.0001 0.0000 β  0.0000 
ν   0.0002 0.0000 β  0.0000 
r   -0.0028 0.0018 β  0.1186 
r   -0.0183 0.0104 β  0.0798 
D  (10:05-11:05) 0.0001 0.0000 α  0.0242 
D  (11:05-12:05) 0.0001 0.0000 α  0.0026 
D  (12:05-13:05) 0.0001 0.0000 α  0.1142 
D  (13:05-14:05) 0.0001 0.0000 α  0.0534 
D  (14:05-15:05) 0.0001 0.0000 α  0.0099 
D  (15:05-16:05) -0.0001 0.0001 α  0.0780 
D  (16:05-17:05) 0.0000 0.0001 α  0.6301 
R-squared 0.0007 * White heteroscedasticity robust std. errors




Table 9 - Hypotheses for research question 2 
  Result 
β 0 β 0 Reject  
β 0 β 0 Fail to reject  
β 0 β 0 Fail to reject  
α 0, α 0, . . , α 0 α 0, α 0, . . , α 0 Reject  
 
In Table 9 we see that we fail to reject the hypothesis that overnight return and the lagged 
return coefficient are different from zero. Normalized order flow is significant and support 
that positive (negative) normalized order flows are associated with a positive (negative) return 
the next 15 minutes.  We test the jointly significance of the time dummies with an F-test of a 
restricted model without the dummies over an unrestricted model. We reject the null 
hypothesis which states that there are no intraday differences in returns.  The results indicate 
that returns are higher at the middle of the day. The dependent variable is 15 minutes after the 
explanatory variable which means that the estimated higher return is between 10:20 and 
15:20. However, the coefficients are not all individually significant and we cannot claim that 
they are positive or negative.   
The R-squared is very low for this regression compared to the regressions on the OBX index 
in Moberg (2008). This seems reasonable to some extent, since an index will have a lower 
standard deviation, due to correlations between securities. However, the low R-squared 
compared to studies at indices (e.g.  Blume, et al., 1989; Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004; 
Dunne, et al., 2010), may suggest that modeling individual stock returns at such a short 
horizon is less sensible than modeling an index.  
 
5.3. Robustness 
We have only considered securities with a high turnover in the sample period, thus the results 
cannot be generalized for illiquid securities. It is reasonable to assume that volatility in our 
sample period differs from normal market conditions due to the financial crisis starting in 
2008. We have not modeled volatility and hence this might influence our results. However, 
our sample is in microstructure terms relatively large, and the squared residuals seem 
acceptable.    
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Omitted variables are an important issue that can cause bias in a model. One might suggest 
that security prices are influenced by the general economic outlook, which might be measured 
by including an index in the model. However, calculating the index returns for each five 
seconds are considerably more complicated and hence not prioritized.  
Figure 6 shows the root mean squared error (RMSE) for each of the 30 stocks in RQ1. The 
stocks are arranged descending after turnover. A large RMSE means that the in-sample 
predicted returns have large average deviations from the observed return. We see that the 
models for temporary and permanent impact have a better fit for the most trades stocks. 
Figure 6 - Root mean squared error 
	
 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and further research 
In the empirical analysis we find support for a temporary and permanent price impact from 
trades larger than 0.2 % of daily traded volume. Theory suggests that impacts from large 
trades are related to private information (Easley and O'Hara, 1987). However, we cannot 
know if the impact is due to private information or not. We observe that large buy-initiated 
(sell-initiated) transactions are positively (negatively) correlated with returns the next 5 
seconds and 10 minutes. This observation of price impact is consistent with several studies at 
other exchanges (e.g. Holthausen, et al., 1987; Hasbrouck and Schwartz, 1988; Almgren, et 










The test for intraday differences support the alternative hypothesis that price impacts do vary. 
This finding suggest that optimization of excution costs, such as proposed by Bertsimas and 
Lo (1998), should take into account the differences in the intraday price impacts. Intuitivly 
these results seem reasonable because the intraday volume has a characteristic u-shape.  
We find that normalized order flows are positivly correlated with returns. The interpretation is 
that a positive (negative) imbalance between the value of buy-initiated and sell-initiated 
transactions in a 15 minutes interval, are assosiated with positive (negative) returns the next 
15 minutes. The R-squared is very low compared to similar studies preformed with indicies, 
and may suggest that its difficult to explain short term returns in individual stocks. This is  
what we would expect form a random walk perspective. On the other hand, all our models 
suggest that there are a negative correlation in returns, which indicate mean reversal.  
If we had more time available we would consider conducting a panel data analysis of large 
transactions. E.g. we could take the largest daily trade in each stock and estimate the price 
impact. Then we might better control for any differences in the stocks’ characteristics. In 
further empirical research it would be interesting to see if the price impacts are different in 
periods with more or less asymmetric information. An example can be before and after 
financial statements are issued from companies. More comprehensive theories of limit order 
markets are also an area of research with several possibilities. New theories could shed light 
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Appendix A: Estimated coefficients research question 1  
Estimated coefficients from research question 1 Temporary Permanent 
Alternative hypotheses  β 0 β 0 β β 0  β 0 β 0 β 0 β 0 β β 0 
Explanatory variables  Obs. S ,  S , D ,  S , , S , D ,  Obs. √S ,  √S , D ,  ν ,  r ,  √S , , √S , D ,  
Stocks:       
Acergy 36174 0.0641*** -0.0937*** -0.0296*** 34083 0.0092*** -0.0109*** 0.0004*** -0.2869*** -0,0018 
Acta Holding 44470 0.067*** -0.0874*** -0.0203*** 42265 0.0173*** -0.0315*** 0.0001*** -0.4409*** -0.0142*** 
Crew Gold Corporation 57650 0.0476*** -0.1271*** -0.0795*** 54928 0.0195*** -0.0453*** 0.0001*** -0.4771*** -0.0258*** 
Fred. Olsen Energy 59614 0.0404*** -0.0533*** -0.0129*** 56288 0.0087*** -0.0104*** 0.0002*** -0.3827*** -0,0017 
Frontline 49728 0.0277*** -0.0632*** -0.0355*** 46956 0.0171*** -0.0199*** 0.0002*** -0.0297*** -0.0027* 
Golden Ocean Group 49109 0.0848*** -0.1372*** -0.0523*** 47014 0.0198*** -0.0175*** 0.0003*** -0.3961*** 0,0022 
Marine Harvest 52371 0.0901*** -0.2118*** -0.1217*** 49677 0.0145*** -0.0222*** 0.0003*** -0.3842*** -0.0077*** 
Norsk Hydro 20665 0.0305*** -0.0788*** -0.0483*** 19635 0.0180*** -0.017*** 0.0004*** -0.3184*** 0,001 
Norske Skogindustrier 55405 0.0894*** -0.1928*** -0.1034*** 52706 0.0096*** -0.0257*** 0.0001*** -0.3546*** -0.0162*** 
Norwegian Property 48005 -0.0085 -0.0133 -0.0219*** 45197 0.0025 -0.0274*** 0.0001* -0.4359*** -0.0249*** 
Orkla 29138 0.0471*** -0.0796*** -0.0325*** 27463 0.0037** -0.0086*** 0.0002*** -0.3393*** -0.0049*** 
PA Resources 46205 0.0793*** -0.1197*** -0.0405*** 43848 0.0118*** -0.0293*** 0.0001** -0.3436*** -0.0175*** 
Petroleum Geo-Services 34347 0.0511*** -0.1292*** -0.0781*** 32636 0.0231*** -0.0179*** 0.0003*** -0.3099*** 0,0053 
Prosafe 50034 0.0653*** -0.1284*** -0.0631*** 47150 0.0119*** -0.0234*** 0.0002*** -0.3235*** -0.0115*** 
Questerre Energy Corporation 54830 0.031*** -0.0612*** -0.0303*** 52407 0.0121*** -0.0271*** 0.0002*** -0.3777*** -0.015*** 
Renewable Energy Corporation 21610 0.0616*** -0.1155*** -0.0539*** 20521 0.0052* -0.0078** 0.0003*** -0.3327*** -0,0026 
Royal Caribbean Cruises 56410 0.0276*** -0.1464*** -0.1188*** 53008 0.0076*** -0.0314*** 0.0002*** -0.3622*** -0.0238*** 
Schibsted 61093 0.0152*** -0.0893*** -0.0741*** 57584 0.0123*** -0.0273*** 0.0002*** -0.375*** -0.0149*** 
Scorpion Offshore 26858 0.0203*** -0.045*** -0.0247*** 25125 0.0086*** -0.0205*** 0.0001** -0.4896*** -0.0119*** 
Seadrill 33657 0.0173** -0.0635*** -0.0463*** 31774 0.0058*** -0.0146*** 0.0003*** -0.3083*** -0.0087*** 
Sevan Marine 54522 0.0014 -0.006* -0.0046** 51800 0.0088*** -0.0228*** 0.0002*** -0.375*** -0.0139*** 
Songa Offshore 65316 0.0284*** -0.0442*** -0.0158*** 61792 0.0167*** -0.0297*** 0.0002*** -0.3967*** -0.013*** 
Statoil 16237 0.0235*** -0.045*** -0.0215*** 15476 0.0083*** -0.0102*** 0.0001** -0.2844*** -0,0019 
Storebrand 46409 0.0116 -0.0823*** -0.0708*** 43499 0.0033 -0.0173*** 0.0003*** -0.3935*** -0.0141*** 
Subsea 7 52805 0.0526*** -0.0907*** -0.038*** 49721 0.0136*** -0.0201*** 0.0001*** -0.3118*** -0.0065*** 
Tandberg 40485 0.0059** -0.0242*** -0.0182*** 38313 0.0056*** -0.0122*** 0.0002*** -0.3145*** -0.0066*** 
Telenor 31071 0.0158** -0.0736*** -0.0578*** 29479 0.0022 -0.0112*** 0.0001** -0.342*** -0.009*** 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company 49162 0.0054** -0.0114*** -0.006* 46400 0.0142*** -0.0235*** 0.0002*** -0.3244*** -0.0093*** 
Tomra Systems 56024 0.0336*** -0.1091*** -0.0755*** 52613 0.0119*** -0.0105*** 0.0003*** -0.5247*** 0,0015 
Yara International 23121 0.0242*** -0.0715*** -0.0473*** 22161 0.0030 -0.0097*** 0.0001*** -0.2624*** -0.0068*** 





Temporary time-dummies coefficients for buyer initiated transactions. ∑ δ , D S ,  
Stock 09:30 - 10:30 10:30 - 11:30 11:30 - 12:30 12:30 - 13:30 13:30 - 14:30 14:30 - 15:30 15:30 - 16:30 16:30 - 17:20 
Acergy -0.056*** -0.0507*** -0.0449*** -0.0441*** -0.0405*** -0.046*** -0.0386*** -0.0123 
Acta Holding -0.0569*** -0.0371*** -0.064*** -0.0635*** -0.0532*** -0.064*** -0.0526*** -0.0255** 
Crew Gold Corporation -0.0138 -0.0218 -0.0225 -0.0085 0.0002 -0.004 0.0069 0.1175*** 
Fred. Olsen Energy -0.0302*** -0.0353*** -0.0266*** -0.0338*** -0.036*** -0.0318*** -0.0277*** -0.0268*** 
Frontline -0.0012 -0.0053 -0.0078 -0.0058 -0.0025 -0.0028 0.034*** 0.0655*** 
Golden Ocean Group -0.0256 -0.027 -0.0415** -0.0375* -0.0486*** -0.0513*** -0.028* -0.0508*** 
Marine Harvest -0.0286** -0.0763*** -0.043*** -0.0662*** -0.0702*** -0.0521*** -0.0526*** -0.0123 
Norsk Hydro -0.0148 -0.0163 -0.0121 -0.02 -0.0264* -0.0209 -0.0183 -0.0482** 
Norske Skogindustrier -0.0341*** -0.0357*** -0.0289** -0.042*** -0.0544*** -0.0576*** -0.0476*** -0.0251* 
Norwegian Property 0.0195** 0.0104 0.0118 0.0138 0.0183* 0.0248*** 0.0181** 0.0184* 
Orkla -0.0234* -0.0326** -0.0415*** -0.036*** -0.0277** -0.0447*** -0.0219* -0.0198 
PA Resources -0.0453*** -0.0581*** -0.069*** -0.053*** -0.0443*** -0.0592*** -0.0459*** -0.0176** 
Petroleum Geo-Services -0.0197 0.0028 -0.0404*** -0.0082 -0.0288** -0.0115 -0.009 0.0151 
Prosafe -0.0554*** -0.0549*** -0.0409*** -0.0469*** -0.0598*** -0.0585*** -0.0513*** -0.0376*** 
Questerre Energy Corp. -0.0117* -0.0234*** -0.008 -0.0195** -0.022*** -0.0136* 0.0078 0.0685*** 
Renewable Energy Corp. -0.0182 -0.0376* -0.0569*** -0.0169 -0.0415* -0.0316 -0.0006 0.0119 
Royal Caribbean Cruises 0.0072 0.0104 0.0062 0.0019 0.0072 -0.0046 0.0336*** 0.0934*** 
Schibsted -0.0038 -0.0011 -0.0036 0.0005 0.021*** -0.0118** 0.0013 -0.0118** 
Scorpion Offshore -0.0159* -0.0133 -0.0179** -0.0151 -0.0038 -0.0061 -0.0141* 0.005 
Seadrill 0.0147 0.004 -0.0038 -0.0048 -0.0055 0.0005 0.0141 0.0057 
Sevan Marine 0.0036 0.0177*** 0.0112* 0.0085* 0.0023 0.0068 0.0078** 0.0058 
Songa Offshore -0.0209*** -0.0217*** -0.0197** -0.0235*** -0.0205*** -0.021*** -0.0097 0.0046 
Statoil 0.0379*** 0.0163 0.0283* -0.0074 -0.0195* 0.0141 0.0017 0.0235 
Storebrand -0.0006 -0.004 0.0166 0.0003 0.0167 -0.0062 0.0038 0.0499*** 
Subsea 7 -0.0222** -0.019* -0.0119 -0.0054 -0.0321*** -0.0331*** -0.0319*** -0.0086 
Tandberg 0.0025 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0069* 0.0007 
Telenor -0.0069 0.0259** 0.0057 -0.0063 0.0081 0.0161 0.0271*** -0.0077 
TGS-NOPEC 0.0044 0.0022 0.0147** -0.0001 0.0091* 0.0053 0.0086** 0.0165*** 
Tomra Systems -0.0327** -0.0142 -0.0305** 0.004 -0.0154 -0.0159 -0.02 -0.0191 
Yara International 0.008 -0.0092 0.0068 -0.0038 0.0083 0.0127 0.0112 0.025 





Temporary time-dummy coefficients for seller initiated transactions. ∑ ϕ , D S , D ,  
Stock 09:30 - 10:30 10:30 - 11:30 11:30 - 12:30 12:30 - 13:30 13:30 - 14:30 14:30 - 15:30 15:30 - 16:30 16:30 - 17:20 
Acergy 0.0439*** 0.0699*** 0.0485*** 0.0459*** 0.0453** 0.0238 0.0494*** -0.0009 
Acta Holding 0.0729*** 0.0537*** 0.0802*** 0.0743*** 0.0575*** 0.0805*** 0.0665*** 0.0115 
Crew Gold Corporation 0.0722*** 0.0661*** 0.0818*** 0.0662*** 0.0613*** 0.0531*** 0.0382** -0.0902*** 
Fred. Olsen Energy 0.0227*** 0.0413*** 0.0355*** 0.0397*** 0.0314*** 0.035*** 0.0251*** 0.0231*** 
Frontline 0.0198 0.0227* 0.0183 0.0159 0.0122 0.0157 -0.0329*** -0.1068*** 
Golden Ocean Group 0.0386** 0.0366* 0.0793*** 0.0509** 0.0639*** 0.0535*** 0.0262 0.0266 
Marine Harvest 0.1193*** 0.1548*** 0.1158*** 0.1434*** 0.1745*** 0.1284*** 0.1216*** 0.0634*** 
Norsk Hydro 0.051** 0.0442** 0.041** 0.0658*** 0.07*** 0.0584*** 0.0529*** 0 
Norske Skogindustrier 0.1053*** 0.0889*** 0.1044*** 0.1139*** 0.1508*** 0.1045*** 0.1013*** 0.0445*** 
Norwegian Property -0.0122 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0013 -0.004 -0.0086 -0.005 -0.0455*** 
Orkla 0.0438*** 0.0561*** 0.0426*** 0.0604*** 0.063*** 0.0446*** 0.0439*** 0.043*** 
PA Resources 0.0522*** 0.091*** 0.0962*** 0.0336*** 0.0752*** 0.068*** 0.0723*** 0.0363*** 
Petroleum Geo-Services 0.0854*** 0.0545*** 0.091*** 0.0464** 0.0791*** 0.0784*** 0.0417** 0.0297 
Prosafe 0.1051*** 0.1168*** 0.0855*** 0.0849*** 0.1045*** 0.1093*** 0.1004*** 0.0623*** 
Questerre Energy Corp. 0.0271*** 0.0275*** 0.0216** 0.0181 0.0357*** 0.0266*** -0.0103 -0.1224*** 
Renewable Energy Corp. 0.0028 0.0599** 0.0861*** 0.0551* 0.1326*** 0.0535* 0.0051 -0.0169 
Royal Caribbean Cruises 0.0708*** 0.0715*** 0.0851*** 0.0716*** 0.071*** 0.0959*** 0.0056 -0.1053*** 
Schibsted 0.0682*** 0.067*** 0.0645*** 0.0583*** 0.0433*** 0.0698*** 0.0629*** 0.046*** 
Scorpion Offshore 0.0323*** 0.0371*** 0.0309** 0.0377*** 0.0215* 0.0224* 0.0303** 0.0155 
Seadrill 0.0299* 0.0171 0.0271* 0.0005 0.0408*** 0.0244* 0.0047 -0.0128 
Sevan Marine -0.0064 -0.0217*** -0.0192*** -0.0073 0.0006 -0.0135** -0.029*** -0.0582*** 
Songa Offshore 0.0288*** 0.0299*** 0.0284*** 0.0322*** 0.0314*** 0.0209** 0.0133 -0.0537*** 
Statoil -0.0411*** -0.027 -0.0324* 0.0054 -0.0138 -0.0233 -0.0207 -0.0413* 
Storebrand 0.0287 0.0644*** 0.0246 0.0596*** 0.0369* 0.0553*** 0.0491*** 0.0151 
Subsea 7 0.031*** 0.0463*** 0.0383*** 0.0339*** 0.0595*** 0.0398*** 0.042*** 0.0085 
Tandberg 0.0091 0.0109 0.0101 0.0095 0.0153** 0.0162*** -0.0048 0.0119* 
Telenor 0.0258** -0.0084 0.0202 0.0456*** 0.0258* -0.0016 -0.0106 0.0155 
TGS-NOPEC -0.0175** -0.0228*** -0.0222*** -0.0043 -0.0193** -0.0264*** -0.0237*** -0.0489*** 
Tomra Systems 0.079*** 0.0856*** 0.0881*** 0.0627*** 0.0847*** 0.0846*** 0.0807*** 0.0439** 
Yara International 0.0305** 0.0292* 0.0096 0.0142 0.0224 0.0141 -0.0086 -0.0419 





Permanent time-dummies coefficients for buyer initiated transactions. ∑ δ , D S ,   
Stock  09:30 ‐ 10:30  10:30 ‐ 11:30  11:30 ‐ 12:30  12:30 ‐ 13:30  13:30 ‐ 14:30  14:30 ‐ 15:30  15:30 ‐ 16:30  16:30 ‐ 17:20 
Acergy -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0050 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0059** -0.0014 
Acta Holding -0.008*** -0.0027 -0.0063* -0.0089*** -0.0098*** -0.0071** -0.0109*** -0.0073* 
Crew Gold Corporation -0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0092*** -0.0097*** -0.0071** -0.0072** -0.0016 0.0144*** 
Fred. Olsen Energy -0.0063*** -0.0044* -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.005** -0.0049** -0.0084*** 0.0015 
Frontline -0.0076*** -0.0082*** -0.0059** -0.0051* -0.0084*** -0.0101*** -0.0088*** -0.0089*** 
Golden Ocean Group -0.0104*** -0.0121*** -0.0163*** -0.0054 -0.0102** -0.009** -0.0106*** -0.028*** 
Marine Harvest -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0046 -0.005* -0.0095*** -0.0153*** 
Norsk Hydro -0.0096*** -0.0137*** -0.0118*** -0.0122*** -0.0118*** -0.0121*** -0.0149*** -0.0208*** 
Norske Skogindustrier 0.0030 0.0014 -0.0002 0.0027 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0067** 0.0003 
Norwegian Property 0.0058** 0.0020 0.0027 0.0021 0.0034 0.0043 0.0044 0.006* 
Orkla -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0010 0.0033 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0033 
PA Resources -0.0008 -0.0046** -0.004** -0.0066*** -0.0019 0.0002 -0.0035* 0.0107*** 
Petroleum Geo-Services -0.0124*** -0.0108*** -0.0134*** -0.0158*** -0.0175*** -0.0124*** -0.0138*** -0.0064 
Prosafe -0.0069*** -0.0059** -0.0081*** -0.0064** -0.0069** -0.0044* -0.0055** -0.006** 
Questerre Energy Corp. 0.0001 0.0017 0.0064** 0.0008 -0.0018 0.0030 0.0047* 0.0141*** 
Renewable Energy Corp. 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0024 0.0008 -0.0034 0.0027 0.0001 0.0060 
Royal Caribbean Cruises -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0014 0.0004 0.0001 0.0039 0.0033 -0.0030 
Schibsted -0.0052** -0.0023 -0.0053** -0.0034 -0.0043* -0.006*** -0.0066*** -0.0102*** 
Scorpion Offshore -0.0024 0.0009 -0.0043 -0.0028 -0.0039 -0.0063** -0.0047* 0.0076** 
Seadrill -0.0009 0.0021 0.0011 0.0001 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0039* -0.0111*** 
Sevan Marine -0.0037 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0017 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0052** 0.0116*** 
Songa Offshore -0.007*** -0.0073*** -0.0066*** -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0083*** -0.0085*** -0.0016 
Statoil -0.0003 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0059** -0.004* -0.0022 -0.0054** -0.0096*** 
Storebrand -0.0001 -0.0033 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0044 0.007** 
Subsea 7 -0.0046** -0.0048* -0.0052** -0.0059** -0.0074*** -0.0056** -0.0066*** -0.0044 
Tandberg -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0013 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0072*** 
Telenor 0.0053** 0.0069*** 0.0032 0.0057** 0.0062** 0.0045** 0.0004 -0.0051* 
TGS-NOPEC -0.0041* -0.0076*** -0.0044 -0.0079*** -0.0089*** -0.0072*** -0.0089*** -0.0026 
Tomra Systems -0.0112*** -0.0072*** -0.007*** -0.0039 -0.0065*** -0.0053** -0.0098*** -0.0089*** 
Yara International 0.0047* 0.0001 0.0059** 0.0045 0.0044 0.0039 0.0023 -0.0099** 





Permanent time-dummy coefficients for seller initiated transactions. ∑ ϕ , D S , D ,   
Stock 09:30 - 10:30 10:30 - 11:30 11:30 - 12:30 12:30 - 13:30 13:30 - 14:30 14:30 - 15:30 15:30 - 16:30 16:30 - 17:20 
Acergy -0.005 -0.0025 -0.0044 0.0016 -0.0051 -0.005 0.0003 -0.0083* 
Acta Holding 0.0105*** 0.0061* 0.0093*** 0.0117*** 0.0112*** 0.0148*** 0.0182*** 0.013*** 
Crew Gold Corporation 0.014*** 0.0163*** 0.0203*** 0.0219*** 0.021*** 0.0261*** 0.0222*** 0.0052 
Fred. Olsen Energy -0.0019 0.001 0.0013 0.002 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0024 -0.0019 
Frontline 0.0077*** 0.0055** 0.0024 0.0032 0.0043 0.0021 0.0015 0.0026 
Golden Ocean Group -0.0019 -0.0004 0.006 -0.004 -0.0008 0.0054 0.0006 -0.0072 
Marine Harvest 0.0008 0.0026 0.0014 0.0051* 0.0061** 0.0066** 0.0063** 0.0028 
Norsk Hydro 0.0035 0.0065 0.0064 0.0071* 0.0092** 0.0061 0.0045 -0.0012 
Norske Skogindustrier 0.0028 0.0085*** 0.0086*** 0.0039 0.0091*** 0.0079*** 0.008*** 0.0059* 
Norwegian Property 0.0072** 0.0133*** 0.0174*** 0.0171*** 0.015*** 0.0139*** 0.0144*** 0.0116*** 
Orkla 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0025 
PA Resources 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0104*** 0.0121*** 0.0092*** 0.0139*** 0.0029 
Petroleum Geo-Services 0.0032 0.0036 0.0049 0.004 0.0021 0.0008 0.0066* 0.0045 
Prosafe 0.0065** 0.0103*** 0.0091*** 0.0096*** 0.01*** 0.0107*** 0.012*** 0.0091*** 
Questerre Energy Corp. 0.0025 0.0045* 0.0003 0.0044 0.0094*** 0.0002 0.003 -0.0004 
Renewable Energy Corp. -0.0046 -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0024 -0.0048 -0.0148*** -0.0024 
Royal Caribbean Cruises 0.0142*** 0.0144*** 0.0178*** 0.0115*** 0.0148*** 0.0096*** 0.0106*** 0.0108*** 
Schibsted 0.0099*** 0.0094*** 0.0137*** 0.0144*** 0.0156*** 0.0147*** 0.0146*** 0.0196*** 
Scorpion Offshore 0.0054* 0.0072** 0.0109*** 0.0139*** 0.0134*** 0.0094*** 0.0129*** 0.002 
Seadrill 0.0041 0.0034 0.0037 0.0024 0.0031 0.0019 0.0068*** -0.0005 
Sevan Marine 0.0099*** 0.0068** 0.0095*** 0.005 0.0105*** 0.0078*** 0.0102*** 0.0029 
Songa Offshore 0.0105*** 0.0135*** 0.0129*** 0.0118*** 0.0144*** 0.0129*** 0.0124*** 0.0015 
Statoil 0.002 0.001 -0.0002 0.0026 -0.0003 0.0025 0.002 -0.0019 
Storebrand 0.0044 0.0067** 0.0051 0.0061* 0.0064* 0.0064** 0.0056* 0.0018 
Subsea 7 0.0062** 0.0055** 0.0057** 0.0061** 0.0081*** 0.0046* 0.0076*** 0.0015 
Tandberg 0.0018 0.0034 0.002 0.0021 0.0031 0.0015 0.0007 0.0067** 
Telenor -0.0007 -0.0027 0.0002 -0.0035 0 -0.001 0.0011 0.0088** 
TGS-NOPEC 0.0048* 0.0089*** 0.0071** 0.0108*** 0.012*** 0.01*** 0.0112*** 0.0084** 
Tomra Systems -0.0012 0.0013 0.0008 -0.0016 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0039 
Yara International -0.005* -0.0028 -0.0046 -0.0105*** -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0035 0.0037 




Appendix B: Likelihood ratio test 
We test the unrestricted models (model 1 and 2) and the restricted models without time-
dummies. The alternative hypothesis is that the unrestricted model has a significant better fit 
measured with log-likelihood. Test statistics for the Likelihood ratio test (LR):  
LR = 2 L L  where “L” is the log-likelihood for the unrestricted L  and the restricted L  
model. Reject H  if LR χ . , . The P-value for the LR test is: Prob LR χ . , . 
Temporary Permanent 
Stock LR P-Value LR P-Value 
Acergy 69 0.0000 27 0.0395 
Acta Holding 99 0.0000 48 0.0000 
Crew Gold Corporation 184 0.0000 143 0.0000 
Fred. Olsen Energy 101 0.0000 55 0.0000 
Frontline 178 0.0000 39 0.0009 
Golden Ocean Group 37 0.0019 73 0.0000 
Marine Harvest 155 0.0000 50 0.0000 
Norsk Hydro 41 0.0005 54 0.0000 
Norske Skogindustrier 235 0.0000 45 0.0001 
Norwegian Property 43 0.0003 84 0.0000 
Orkla 74 0.0000 14 0.6228 
PA Resources 334 0.0000 151 0.0000 
Petroleum Geo-Services 99 0.0000 42 0.0004 
Prosafe 131 0.0000 40 0.0007 
Questerre Energy Corporation 185 0.0000 50 0.0000 
Renewable Energy Corporation 110 0.0000 32 0.0097 
Royal Caribbean Cruises 412 0.0000 79 0.0000 
Schibsted 121 0.0000 87 0.0000 
Scorpion Offshore 53 0.0000 95 0.0000 
Seadrill 55 0.0000 37 0.0020 
Sevan Marine 74 0.0000 53 0.0000 
Songa Offshore 152 0.0000 79 0.0000 
Statoil 60 0.0000 40 0.0007 
Storebrand 66 0.0000 28 0.0356 
Subsea 7 95 0.0000 20 0.2420 
Tandberg 27 0.0376 23 0.1040 
Telenor 87 0.0000 38 0.0016 
TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company 50 0.0000 37 0.0019 
Tomra Systems 85 0.0000 650 0.0000 
Yara International 34 0.0061 36 0.0032 






Appendix C:  Output from the model fitting (Acergy) 
The Box Jenkins framework aims to estimate parsimonious, stationary and invertible models 
with residuals that approximate a white noise process (Enders, 2010). It is proven 
mathematically that the autocorrelation function (ACF) for an autoregressive (AR) of order p 
process is exponentially decaying and the partial ACF dies after lag p. We also have that the 
ACF dies after lag q for a moving average (MA) process of order q and the partial ACF is 
exponentially decaying. The Box-Jenkins methodology relies on these facts in order to 
identify the best model. This methodology is often referred to as an art rather than a science, 
since there is a balance between fit and parsimoniousness and other ad hoc choices (Enders, 
2010).  
Some of the output (Acergy stock) used for the model estimation is shown on the next page. 
We can see that both of the temporary and permanent impact variables have high non-
converging ACF. The non-convergent series problem is solved by integrating the series at 
level one. After differencing, the autocorrelation in the dependent variable has an exponential 
declining partial ACF and the ACF is shortly lived. Based on the Box-Jenkins methodology 
these characteristics are similar to a moving average specification (MA). ARMA 
specifications for our data give unstable solutions since the lagged dependent variable is often 
the same as the previous, resulting in a unit root. An MA specification is invertible and a 

























Appendix D:  Panel data analysis 
We include the most important tests from our panel data analysis in research question 2. We 
use a 5% significance level. We initially run an F-test to test whether our panel has significant 
fixed effects. The test statistic equals 1	 	F 1.58 , so we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no fixed effects. This means we can run a pooled OLS. 
Initially we have two alternative measures for the 15 minutes order flow, normalized 
ν  and relative	 ν :  
ν
∑ T ∑ T		






First we determine whether both measures for the order flow should be included. The model 
gave insignificant results for the relative order flow. Hence, we test whether relative order 
flow should be included in the model or not. We use an F-test with the restricted model where 
only normalized order flow is included and the unrestricted with both measures. The test 
statistics is 1.45	 F 3.58 , which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis stating 
that the unrestricted model has the same explanatory power as the unrestricted.  
Then we test if model 3 (unrestricted) should include the seven intercept dummies. The test 
statistic equals 5.57	 F 2.01 , this means that we can reject the null hypothesis. 
To control for different variance across stocks and non-constant variance we use White 





Appendix E: Data processing in Perl.  
We received 3 years of data from Oslo Stock Exchange. The data included all security 
transactions, orders and security changes, except data that are considered private, e.g. hidden 
orders. Because of the size and complexity of the dataset we use the Perl programming 
language17 to prepare the data for the econometric analyzes. Form a starting point with little 
programming experience this took us a while to figure out. Therefore, to ease the effort for 
future scholars that use high-frequency data we have included some of the Perl scripts. 
Because the scope of this section is to guide the future researcher, the scripts are simplified to 
fit in an appendix. Be aware that if you study data from another period the field codes and 
data structure may be different from our sample, but the general approach may be applied. In 
this example we extract on file for a selection of stocks. Each file contains all stock 
transactions (price, quantity, time-stamp) and the current bid and ask quote.  
We walk through the processing of the real time files from OBI OCDF. All the input and 
output files are semicolon separated. The main challenge is that field codes do not have a 
constant column for each trading session and hence we have to search each line for the 
relevant field codes. Perl is ideal for this task, because of its effectiveness in processing one 
line at a time and swiftly recognize combinations of expressions (pattern matching).  
We found most effective to divide the extraction of data in a three step process:  
1)  Filter the data and keep security changes and security transactions 
2)  Extract data for each security by ISIN number to separate folders  
3)  Extract transactions with time and current bid and ask quotes for each stock  
  
                                                 
17We use Strawberry Perl for windows in our data processing ( http://strawberryperl.com/ ) 
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For explanation of all fields we refer to the technical documentation that is enclosed with the 
data (Oslo Børs Informasjon AS, 2006). For our purpose to type of lines are of relevance; 
security transactions [t] and security changes [Sc] (henceforth, the field codes we search for is 
embedded in []). 
General approach 
For each step we have an input folder with data and an empty output folder prepared in 
advance. The reason for the folder structure is that we keep the filenames in the same date 
format (yyyymmdd.txt). We keep the date format to check dates at later stages, and when 
processing all files in a folder the data is processed in the right order. For illustration purposes 
we state the folders and content that are necessary before each step.  
Operators used in pattern matching Meaning of expression
/[]/ Contain [] 
[]$ Ends with [] 
^[] Starts with [] 
&& And 
|| Or 
| Either  





Step 1: Filter the data and keep security changes and security transactions 
Each time [t] the best ask [1a] or bid [1b] price changes there will be a security change [Sc] 
line in the OCDF. For each stock transaction there is a security transaction [t] line where we 
can find the traded quantity [Tq], the traded price [Tp] and the date and time of the transaction 





Required before running script 1: 
d:/inputdata/*yymmdd.txt   real time files from OSE
d:/outputstep1/  empty folder 
 
#Script 1 discards all lines except security changes and security transactions from input files 
my $InputFolder, $file, $OutputFile, = ( "d:/inputdata", "", "d:/outputstep1" ); 
chdir "$InputFolder" or die; 
 
while (<*.txt>) { 
$file = $_; 
print "Processing $file\n"; 
$outputfile = substr $file, length($file) - 12, 12;      
open( INPUTFILE, "$file" ) or die "$!"; 
open( OUTPUTFILE, ">", "$OutputFolder$OutputFile" ) or die "$!"; 
while (<INPUTFILE>) { 
    
if ( /Sc;/ && /(1a|1b)\d/ && /t\d/ )|| ( /t;/ && /Tq\d/ && /Tp\d/ && /DTd\d/ ) 
{ 






Step 2: Extract data for each security by ISIN number to separate folders 
For each trading day there are files with fixed data. From them we extract one file for each 
day placed them in a separate folder (with equivalent names as step 1), e.g.  one day if there 







To extract stock names and ISIN numbers it is only necessary to modify the first script 
slightly for it to work with the fixed data files (change the folders and if statement).  However, 
the fixed data files you can also import to e.g. Excel, hence we do not state the script here.  
After this we made a list over stock names that we extract data for (one name at each line).  
Required before running script 2: 
d:/stocknames.txt  list with stocks that we want to extract data from. 
d:/fixeddata/yyyymmdd.txt  one file for each trading session with stock name;ISIN for each line.  
d:/outputstep1/ yyyymmdd.txt  output from Step 1 
d:/securities/   empty folder 
 
#Scripts  2 makes one folder for each stock name and creates one file for each trading session  with all 
security changes and security transactions for this stock (d:/securities/stock name/yyyymmdd.txt). 
 
my ($isin,$file,$outputfolder,$outputfile,$stock) =("","","d:/securities","",""); 
open (STOCKS,"d:/stocknames.txt") or die "$!"; 
my @stocks = <STOCKS>; 
chomp (@stocks); 
close STOCKS; 
foreach $stock (@stocks) { 
print "Processing $Stock\n"; 
mkdir("$outputfolder$stock\/");   #make a folder for this stock 
while (<d:/outputstep1/*.txt>) {    #loop for each trading day, i.e. for each yyyymmdd.txt 
$file = $_;                                             
$outputfile = substr $file, length($file)-12,12; #remove folder path, get yyyymmdd.txt  
#Retrive the ISIN number for the stock this day: 
open (FIXEDINPUTFILE, "d:/fixedfiles\/$outputfile") or die "$!";   #Open file with stockname and isin 
while (<FIXEDINPUTFILE>) {   
 if (/^$stock/) {     
($stock,$isin) = split(';',$_);  #save the stock name and isin from the semi colon separated file 





open (INPUTFILE, "$file") or die "$!";    
open (OUTPUTFILE, ">",  "$outputfolder$stock\/$outputfile") or die "$!";  
 
while (<INPUTFILE>){ 
if (/$isin/) { 











Step 3: Extract transactions with time and current bid and ask quotes for each stock 
Required before running script 3: 
d:/securities/  output from step 2 
d:/r-input/ -> empty folder  
 
#Script 3 makes one file with all trade for each stock 
 
my $folder = "d:/securities/"; 
my @Stocks = (); 
chdir "$folder" or die; 
while (<*>) {    push( @Stocks, "$_" );   } #make list of stocks from names of folders  
 my $outputfolder = "d:/r-input/"; 
my ($TradedPrice, $TradedQuantity, $DateTime) = ( 0, 0, 0); 
my ($ask,$bid, $Stock,$file,$field, $extention)   = ("NA","NA","","","",".txt"); 
my @SLine = (); 
 
foreach $Stock (@Stocks) {     
print "Processing $Stock\n"; 
open( OUTPUT, ">", "$outputfolder$Stock$extention" ) or die "$!"; 
chdir "$folder$Stock" or die; 
 
while (<*.txt>) { 
$file = $_; 
open( INPUTFILE, "$file" ) or die "$!"; 
#New trading session, reset bid and ask: 
( $ask, $bid) = ("NA", "NA"); 
 
while (<INPUTFILE>) { 
if ( /Sc;/ && /(1a|1b)\d/ && /t\d/ ) {  #True if line is a security change 
chomp;  #Remove newline characters  
@SLine = split( ';', $_ ); 
 
foreach $field (@SLine) { 
if ( $field =~ /^1b\d/ && /\d$/ ) { #True if best bid has changed 
$field =~ s/1b//;  #Remove 1b from string 
$bid = $field; 
} 
elsif ( $field =~ /^1a\d/ && /\d$/ ) { #True if best ask has changed  
$field =~ s/1a//; #Remove 1a from string   




else { #True if line is a security transaction 
chomp; 
@SLine = split( ';', $_ ); 
#Search for relevant fields and remove the field codes: 
foreach $field (@SLine) { 
if ( $field =~ /^DTd\d/ && /\d$/ ) { 
$field =~ s/DTd//; 
$DateTime = $field; 
} 
elsif ( $field =~ /^Tp\d/ && /\d$/ ) { 
$field =~ s/Tp//; 
$TradedPrice = $field; 
} 
elsif ( $field =~ /^(Tq)\d/ ) { 
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$field =~ s/Tq//; 
$TradedQuantity = $field; 
}   
}  
print OUTPUT  "$DateTime;$TradedPrice;$TradedQuantity;$bid;$ask\n"; 
} 






Excluding stocks outside the continuous trading session  
One might want to exclude trades outside the continuous trading session in script 3. However, 
logical conditions with time are not straight forward. Additionally time is given on different 
format for security transactions and security changes, but they all have in common that they 
end with hour, minutes and seconds (hhmmss). Hence, we do this by calculating time in 
seconds after midnight from any string that ends with hhmmss. The time sub routine can be 
included in any script.  The following is an example of how one can exclude all trades outside 
the continuous trading session in script 3: 
Define the opening and closing of the continuous and trading session and a variable for time in the beginning of 
the script. 
my $StartTradingSession =   TimeToSecAfterMidNight("090500"); 
my $EndTradingSession =   TimeToSecAfterMidNight("172000"); 
my $TradeTime  = 0; 
 
Add the following two line before the “print OUTPUT” statement and add a bracket after (}): 
$TradeTimeSec  = TimeToSecAfterMidNight ($DateTime); 
if ($TradeTimeSec < $StartTradingSession || $TradeTimeSec > $EndTradingSession) { 
 
Add the Sub routine at the end of the script: 
sub TimeToSecAfterMidNight { 
#Sub routine converts time (*hhmmss) and returns seconds from midnight
my $HHMMSS = shift; 
my ( $hh, $mm, $ss ) = ( 0, 0, 0 ); 
$HHMMSS =~ s/(\D)+//g; 
$HHMMSS = substr $HHMMSS, length($HHMMSS) - 6, 6; 
$hh = substr $HHMMSS, 0, 2; 
$mm = substr $HHMMSS, 2, 2; 
$ss = substr $HHMMSS, 4, 2; 
$hh =~ s/^0//; 
$mm =~ s/^0//; 
$ss =~ s/^0//; 
$HHMMSS = $hh * 3600 + $mm * 60 + $ss; 
return ($HHMMSS); } 
 
 
